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BASTARDY AND THE STATUTE OF
WILLS: INTERPRETING A SIXTEENTHCENTURY STATUTE WITH CASES AND
READINGS
M.C. Mirow·
The Statute cif Wills of 1540 created a tax loophole for
transfers of property to illegitimate children. 1 Assessments for
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Samuel I. Golieb
Fellow in Legal History, New York University, 1998-1999. This study stems from
work done under the supervision of Professor J .H. Baker whom I thank for his
guidance and suggestions. I thank Professors Barry Cushman, Catherine
McCauliff, Kenneth Parker, Bernard Rudden, and Christopher Tomlins who commented on this work. Members of the Center for Comparative Legal History,
University of Chicago, and members of the New York University Legal History
Colloquium have provided useful criticism. Portions of the research for this article
have been financially supported by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom; the Cambridge Overseas Trust,
Cambridge University; the Frederic William Maitland Fund, Faculty of Law, Cambridge University; the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; and the Saint Louis University School of Law.
1
Throughout this study, unless otherwise indicated, the term "Statute of
Wills" refers to both the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540), 3 STATUTES
OF THE REALM 744-46 (hereinafter "Stat. Wills"), and the Explanation of the Statute of Wills, 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542), 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 901-04
(hereinafter "Stat. Exp!.").
There is substantial literature on the legal status and social history of bas- .
tardy during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a topic not addressed by this
study. See generally Walter J. King, Punishment for Bastardy in Early Seventeenth-Century England, 10 ALBION 130-51 (1978); BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 49 (Peter Laslett, et al. eds., 1980); JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX,
AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); WILLIAM CLERKE, THE
TRIALL OF BASTARDIE (London, 1594); CHRIS GIVEN-WILSON & ALICE CURTEIS, THE
ROYAL BASTARDS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1984); R.H. HELlllHOLZ, CANON LAW AND
THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987); RALPH A. HOUI.BROOKE, CHURCH COURTS AND THE
PEOPLE DURING THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 1520-1570 (1979); THE ENGLISH FAMILY 1450-1700 (1984); MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN
ENGLAND, 1570-1640 (1987); PETER LASLETT, FAMILY LIFE AND ILLICIT LOVE IN
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wardships that would normally be imposed on certain transfers of land to children could be effectively avoided by establishing that the donee was illegitimate, and therefore a
stranger to the donor for the purposes of the statute. English
lawyers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries educated
their colleagues about this newly available tax loophole. In the
inns of court, they discussed the statutory provisions and recent revenue cases from the Court of Wards. They considered
hypothetical situations to define who was and who was not a
bastard for the purposes of the statute. The first part of this
study will briefly set this tax loophole in the general institutional context of both the Statute of Wills and the common
law educational system in England. The second part of the
article· examines the problem of how being an illegitimate
child of a donor created a favorable tax situation under the
Statute of Wills. Concluding observations will then show how
this example sheds light on the relationship between the inns
and the courts, and on how these institutions overlapped and
interacted as they grappled with interpreting ambiguous statutory language.
I. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The English Statute of Wills of 1540 must be seen as one
of many statutory enactments resulting from the Henrician
Reformation, the dissolution of the monasteries, and Henry
VIII's effective program to increase royal revenues. Although
other forms of wealth were appearing in English society during these years, land and rights in land continued to be the
context in which most wealth was perceived. Transfers of
land, particularly upon the death of the owner, were convenient points to assess and collect feudal incidents and royal
prerogative rights, which were by this date expressed in money payments. 2 Many of Henry's political maneuvers and subEARLIER GENERATIONS (1977); IVY PINCHBECK & MARGARET HEWITT, CHILDREN IN
ENGLISH SOCIETY VOLUME I: FROM TunOR TIMES TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
(1969); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800
(1977).
2

The political and fiscal considerations leading to the Statute of Wills and
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sequent enactments attempted to reimpose such incidents. In
fact, the Statute of Wills is most accurately viewed as a taxation statute that happened to create the right to devise a certain portion ofland. 3
Two relevant aspects of this period's unprecedented statutory activity must be noted. First, new statutes provided for
the creation of new institutions of administration and adjudication, such as the Court of Wards. Second, new statutory
provisions called for authoritative interpretations by the profession. The method of legal education in the inns of court
concerning the manner in which readings on statutes were
conducted changed accordingly. Readings became the individual products of the particular reader and often addressed recent
case interpretations of statutory provisions. This article addresses one example of this second change which can best be
understood after considering the general nature of the Court
of Wards and the readings.

the Explanation of the Statute of Wills have been treated fully elsewhere. See
generally 2 J.H. BAKER, THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 192-203 (Selden
Soc'y vol. 94, 1978); J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 12151540 (1968); AR. Buck, The Politics of Land Law in Tudor England, 1529·1540,
11 J. LEGAL HIST. 200-17 (1990); N.G. Jones, The Influence of Reuenue Considerations upon the Remedial Practice of Chancery in Trust Cases, 1536-1660, in COMMUNITIES AND COURTS IN BRITAIN 1150-1900 99-113 (Christopher Brooks & Michael Lobban eds., 1997); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seuenteenth-Century Reuolution
in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 237-39 (1995); Prue Vines,

Land and Royal Reuenue: The Statute for the Explanation of the Statute of Wills,
1542·43, 3 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 113-30 (1997).
I disagree with Ms. Vines's conclusion concerning the provision addressing
the testamentary capacity of married women. She states that "the need to clarify
the position as to capacity resulted not from poor drafting in the Statute of Wills,
but from the conflict between the ecclesiastical courts and the common law courts
in relation to wills and estates." Id. at 129. In my view, lawyers saw the problem
purely within the common law and statutory interpretation as indicated by their
discussions in the inns of court. M.C. Mirow, Monks and Married Women: The
Use of the Yearbooks in Defining Testamentary Capacity in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Readings on Wills, 65 LEGAL HIST. REV. 19-39 (1997).
3
The statute does not have a single taxing provision, but must be read almost in its entirety to determine its operation.
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A. The Court of Wards
The predecessors of the Court of Wards and Liveries were
the individual receivers for the counties under Henry VII, who
were charged with collecting the king's revenues from wardships and other incidents of lands held of him.4 Centralized
control over the collection and administration of these incidents grew during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII,
and by 1528, a Master of the Wards sat regularly at Westminster, conducted judicial business, and was assisted by an attorney.6 The statutes creating the Court of Wards are seen as
formalizing a pre-existing institution whose main activities
were increased substantially by two legislative changes: on
one side, the Statute of Uses and Statute of Wills, and on the
other, the requirement that grants of monastic lands by the
Court of Augmentations be held in knight-service in chief
tenure." Thus, the decisions of the court provided the most
current interpretations of the statutory provisions concerning
wardship and other incidents and therefore should have been
essential material for a student of such statutes.
At least two of the readers studied here had positions
with the court. Robert Nowell, who read in 1561, was appointed the Attorney of the Court of Wards that same year. 7 Hugh
Hare, with his apparently more industrious brother John, was
appointed Clerk of the court in 1589. 8 Furthermore, any of
the readers later made serjeants or judges of the common law
courts might have been involved in deciding a case. 9 Whatever the personnel used to reach a decision, it was "normally
embodied in a formal decree of the court." 10 Another reader of
note on the Statute of Wills was Henry Sherfield. His success-

' H.E. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND RECORDS OF THE COURT
OF WARDS AND LIVERIES 5-6 (1953).
' Id. at 12.
' The two statutes are 32 Hen. VIII, c. 46, and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 22. BELL,

supra note 4, at 14.
1
Id. at 22, n. 4.

' Id. at 26-27.
' Id. at 98.
" Id. at 100.
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ful practice before the Court of Wards has been recounted by
Prest, and his iconoclastic church window smashing has been
illuminated by the work of Slack. 11 Reading on the Statute of
Wills also served James Dyer, John Popham, and Augustine
Nicholls well; each was to have a successful judicial career.
Aside from the pleadings in the cases, the most important
official documents preserving the workings of the Court of
Wards are the Books of Orders which are relatively complete,
and the Books of Decrees which run from about 1572 to
1645. 12 Supplementing these records are the manuscript reports of decrees for cases from 1553 to 1581 by John Hare. 13
James Ley was Attorney of the Court of Wards from 1608 to
1621; his reports of seventy-five cases from the reigu of James
I, subsequently published in 1659, and his Learned Treatise
Concerning Wards and Liveries (published 1641 and 1642) are
useful sources. 14 The Court was abolished in 1646. 15

B. Readings
Educational activities in the inns of court ranged from
informal student-run gatherings to elaborate, ritualistic events
conducted by senior members of the profession. The readings
were the most formal, and perhaps the most technical or sophisticated, of these activities. 16 Within the inns, the period

u WILFRID R. PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH BAR, 1590-1640 30-34 (1986). Paul Slack, The Public Conscience of Henry
Sherfield, in PUBLIC DU'l'Y AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND 151-71 (John Morrill, et al. eds., 1993); Religion Protest and Urban Authority: The Case of Henry Sherfield, Iconoclast, 1633, in 9 STUDIES IN CHURCH
HISTORY 295-302 (Derek Baker ed., 1972); Poverty and Politics in Salisbury 1597·
1666, in CRISIS AND ORDER IN ENGLISH TOWNS, 1500-1700 164-203 (P. Clark & P.
Slack eds., 1972).
12
BELL, supra note 4, at 87 -88.
" Id. at 90. CUL MSS Dd.3.9, Hh.3.1, and li.5.7.
" Apart from Bell's study, see JOEL HURSTFIELD, THE QUEEN'S WARDS; WARDSHIP AND MARRIAGE UNDER ELIZABETH I (2d ed. 1973) for a general description of
the court and wardships.
15
BELL, supra note 4, at 150.
16

Case-putting, bolts, and moots were the law student's "daily fare" according
to Prest or his "bread and butter" according to Lemmings. DAVID LEMMINGS, GENTLEMEN AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR, 1680-1730
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during a reading was a time for education, institutional promotion, and social functions. Readings delivered an intensive
dose of legal learning to the audience, gave the reader an
opportunity to display his knowledge, were closely associated
with a senior utter-barrister's elevation to bencher of an inn,
and provided convenient times for the members of the profession to dine together. 17
Despite their depth of analysis and legal complexity, the
readings contain similar material to that found in the less
formal exercises. Even in this later period of original authorship, readers might borrow substantial portions of text from
earlier readings on the same or similar topics.18 It is very
likely that they were accessible to their audience, pedagogically valuable, and after their delivery provided relatively cohesive statements of law in a particular area. 19 Thus, the readings can properly be regarded as one end-point of the continuum of the inns' educational devices, and, in many instances,
the most sophisticated treatments of contemporary topics
available.
A reading was a structured exegesis of a statute or a
particular provision of a statute. Although before this period
there was a pattern or cycle to the statutes selected as the

77 (1990); WILFRID R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE
EARLY STUARTS, 1590-1640 117-19 (1972); See also W.C. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY
OF THE INNS OF COURT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE 128-66 (1978). Almost all exercises and lectures were oral, with very little
emphasis being placed on the production of written work. Id. at 100. A useful

survey of the exercises in the inns of chancery and the inns of court and of the
relationship between the two types of inns during this period is found in 2 J.H.
BAKER, THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 125-35 (Selden Soc'y vol. 94, 1978).
17

While one might suppose that reading was a necessary prerequisite to elevation to the bench, evidence indicates that utter-barristers could be made
benchers first with the obligation later imposed to read. Ives even describes this
as a "regular proceduren in Lincoln's Inn. E.W. Ives, Promotion in the Legal Profession of Yorkist and Early Tudor England, 75 LAW Q. REV. 348, 351 (1959).
" J.H. BAKER, JOHN SPELMAN'S READING ON Quo WARRANTO xvi-xxi (Selden
Soc'y vol. 113, 1997).
19

M.C. Mirow, The Ascent of the Readings: Some Evidence from the Readings
on Wills, in LEARNING THE LAW: TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF ENGLISH
LAW, 1150-1900 227-54 (Jonathan A. Bush & Alain Wijffels, eds., 1999).
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topics for the readings, by the date of the readings studied
here, readers apparently had free choice in selecting their
statutes. The presentation and content of readings changed
throughout the life of the institution, and it is generally
agreed that the addressing of new statutes marked a new era
in the readings. 20
The fullest contemporary account of readings in the inns
of court describes a substantially similar procedure in all the
inns:
And then the first day after Vacation, after 8 of the clock, he
that is so chosen to read openly in the Hall before all the
company shall read some one such act, or statute, as shall
please him to ground his whole Reading on, for all that vacation; and that done, doth declare such inconveniences and
mischiefs as were unprovided for and now by the same statute be amended; and then reciteth certain doubts and questions which he has devised that may grow upon the said statute, and declareth his judgment therein. That done, one of the
younger utter-barristers rehearseth one question propounded
by the Reader, and doth by way of argument labour to prove
the Reader's opinion to be against the law. 21

Readings were delivered during the Lent and autumn (or
summer) learning vacations of an inn. A reader's first reading
was usually conducted in the autumn, and Lent was the usual
time for his second, or "double," reading, which was often given
before the reader was called as a serjeant. 22 The second read-

20
Louis A. Knafla, The Matriculation Reuolution and Education at the Inns of
Court in Renaissance England, in TUDOR MEN AND INSTITUTIONS 232, 252-53
(Arthur J. Slavin ed., 1972); PREST, supra note 16, at 119-20.
" REPORT OF NICHOLAS BACON, THOMAS DENTON, AND ROBERT CAREY ON THE
STATUS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN ENGLAND, PRESENTED TO THE KING, c. 1540,
reprinted in RICHARDSON, supra note 16, at 415. For a discussion and edition of
this report see D.S. Bland, Henry VIII's Royal Commission on the Inns of Court,
10 J. Soc'¥ PUB. TCHRS. L. 178 (1968). R.M. Fisher, Thomas Cromwell, Dissolution of the Monasteries, and the Inns of Court, 1534-1540, 14 J. Soc'¥ PUB.
TCHRS. L. 103 (1980) contains further discussion of the origins of this report and
editions of related papers concerning Lincoln's Inn and Middle Temple.
" J.H. BAKER, THE ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW 84-85 (Selden Soc'y Supp.

Series vol. v, 1984). There were elaborate rules for giving a serjeant elect the
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ing, several years after the reader's first reading, was considered to be an even more learned and ceremonial occasion than
the first. 23
On the first morning of the reading, the reader entered the
hall, stood at the cupboard, and took the Oaths of Supremacy
and Allegiance. 24 The sub-lecturer then read the statute, or
the applicable "branch" thereof, upon which the reader conducted his reading. The reader delivered a "grave and apologetic"
speech explaining his choice of the statute and setting forth the
divisions of his reading. 25 The reader would then set out ten to
twelve cases on the division, in the form of hypothetical factual
situations for argument. From a list of these cases, the least
senior cupboardman would choose one and argue against the
reader's conclusion. 26 The chosen case would then be argued
up the hierarchy of seniority through the other cupboardmen,
positioned near the cupboard, and benchers, "who are placed on
a form opposite the reader."27 The reader then would speak
defending his position, followed by any judges and serjeants
present who would "argue" the case chosen.28 Thus, we may
opportunity to read before the return of his writ. WILLIAM DUGDALE, ORIGINES
JURIDICIALES, OR HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH LAWS, COURTS OF JUSTICE . . . INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY (London, 2d ed. 1671; first published
1666). Dugdale made use of the account in JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 114-21 (photo. reprint 1979) (S.B. Chrimes ed. 1942) (c. 1470) and
the report quoted above. KENNETH CHARLTON, EDUCATION IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND 172 (1965). Readers were elected from the senior utter-barristers of an inn
who had held such positions for about ten years, in other words, those who had
been members of an inn for between sixteen and eighteen years. J .H. BAKER,
English Legal Profession, 1450-1550, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON
LAW 75, 91 (1986).
"' Richardson, supra note 16, at 106.
" Id. at 206. The oath was first required by 5 Eliz. c. 1, s. 4 (1563), 4 STATlJTES OF THE REALM 403. In the Inner Temple if attendance was insufficient, the
reader, benchers, and utter-barristers could amerce those absent and dissolve the
reading. DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 160.
25
Id. at 206. A division of the reading was a specific legal question arising
from the statutory text and was often the subject of one day's lecture.
26
The cupboardmen were usually the four most senior utter~barristers present
at the reading. Id. at 203.
" Id. at 206.
28
Id. It is not clear whether the judges and serjeants would be attempting to
support the reader's conclusions or merely arguing the points of law in the case.
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think of the Inner Temple representation as accurate for the
method of argumentation in all the inns, "all of which is to be
done ex tempore pro and con."29 Abbreviated arguments might
run into the evening. 30
This outlines the first day's events, and the following days
of the reading were similar. The reading and its argument of
cases were conducted Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays,
interspersed with feasting and entertaining strangers, often
"great lords."31 By all accounts and attempted regulations, the
readings were expensive events.
At the end of the final day of a reading, the reader would
deliver a speech which was followed by the most senior
bencher's remarks. The reader's final speech might have taken
the form of a repetition or summary of his reading, repeating
his divisions and perhaps important conclusions. 32 The cases
were then presented for the "division for that day."33 Two
cupboardmen would argue one case and ask the reader's opinion on the case to be given the next term. 34 In response, the
reader made a short speech and retired without addressing the
substance of the case, a symbol of the continuous nature of
legal education in the inns. This ceremony was followed by a

Nonetheless, from their position in the hall alone, sitting opposite the benchers
with their backs to the reader, it seems more likely than not that they would
support the reader's position. In the Inner Temple a second case would be argued
in the morning. This was chosen by the most senior utter-barrister or a judge. Id.
at 160.
2
~ Id.
30
Id. at 207. In the Inner Temple, at the end of the morning session, the
"reader delivers his Paper of Cases, for that morning to the puisne Vacation ut.
ter-barrister, who is to argue one of those cases he likes best, immediately after
dinner, at the Bench Table end." The utter-barrister would be aided by all the
barristers present, helping him "to break the case and open the points." After the
benchers argued, the reader would conclude. Id. at 160. We should not forget that
"la] reading was also a festive occasion, an opportunity for Wining and dining the
right people.'" E.W. IVES, THE COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND:
THOMAS KEBELL: A CASE STUDY 50 (1983).
" DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 207.
32
PREST, supra note 16, at 124.
" DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 207.
" Id. at 207-08.
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procession through the streets and dinner in the hall.as
The duration of the reading, according to Dugdale, was two
days less than a fortnight.a• This would provide six reading
days. Earlier accounts indicate that the common duration was
between & period of three weeks and three days and a period of
two weeks.a'
It was within the context of such readings that the following example must be examined. The most important decisions
concerning the interpretation of the Statute of Wills were in
the Court of Wards, and the readings in the inns of court provide the setting for tracing the development of the applicable
provisions of the Statute.
II. TRANSFERS TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN UNDER THE
STATUTE OF WILLS

The permissive language of the Statute of Wills relating to
devises and acts executed during the lifetime of the donor created difficulties in the complex area of wardship. The Statute
of Wills states that each person
shall have full and free liberty, power, and authority to give,
dispose, will, and devise, as well by his last will and testament in writing, or otherwise by any act executed in his life,
all his said manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or
any of them at his free will and pleasure; any law, statute, or
other thing heretofore had made or used to the contrary notwithstanding."

" Id. at 208.
" Id. at 207.
" PREST, supra note 16, at 124; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 184 (3d ed., 1990); DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 194. Indicating
that a skeleton of a longer period remained even in Dugdale's day is his note
that although the reader ends his reading after a fortnight, the associated exercises continue for the "reading month" conducted "by readers or vacationers ...
as if the Reading has so long continued." Id. at 160.
38
Stat. Wills, s. 1. Other sections referring to tenures other than socage tenure have similar language but replace "free will and pleasure" with "will and
pleasure." Stat. Wills, ss. 2, 3, and 4. The Statute of Wills, s. 5, addressing socage tenure, uses again "free will and pleasure."
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The Statute of Wills adds further language when the land is
held in knight-service in chief and similar tenures. Here, each
person may
give, dispose, will or assign two parts of the same manors,
lands, tenements, or hereditaments in three parts divided ...
to and for the advancement of his wife, preferment of his children, and payment of his debts, or otherwise at his will and
pleasure; any law, statute, custom, or other thing to the contrary notwithstanding."
The third part not transferred under this provision was subject
to wardship, primer seisin, and livery.
The Explanation of the Statute of Wills repeats this language with these purposes in its preamble and then incorporates the language of the Statute of Wills in its section on
wardship. The Explanation of the Statute of Wills speaks of a
donor's
gift, disposition, or devise by his last will in writing, or otherwise by any act or acts lawfully executed in his life, to his
wife, children, or otherwise.40
These provisions created wardship obligations where none
had existed before their enactment. Ley states that there is "no
dying seised, nor descent" but nonetheless there is "wardship
during the minority."41 Concerning this provision, Bell states:
[l)f the statutes had given the subject a limited freedom to
devise, they had also given the king certain wardships and
primer seisins, where he would have had none before-that is,
on one third of land conveyed during life for the purposes
mentioned in the statute. Thus the statutes and the common
law were to some extent contradictory, and much learning
was displayed in argument as to whether or not, in a particular case, an heir was in ward or should sue livery. 42
" Stat. Wills, ss. 2 and 3 (emphasis added). Stat. Wills, ss. 4 and 5 state "in
manner and form as above declared."
0
'
Stat. Expl., preamble and s. 4.
" J. LEY, A LEARNED TREATISE CONCERNING WARDS AND LIVERIES 25 (1641).
2
'
BELL, supra note 4, at 107.
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Thus, the contemporary practitioner was presented with a new
statute creating new financial responsibilities to the king.
These were, no doubt, important provisions, which were subsequently litigated. As the following discussion indicates, the
interpretation of these provisions was not obvious.
The words "or otherwise" were the source of much difficulty, and it was not for another thirty-five years that their interpretation would be settled. From the plain language of the
statute, it was unclear to what "or otherwise" referred: did the
statute mean that any disposition by will or by the lifetime act
of the donor for any purpose should incur primer seisin or
wardship for land held by knight-service in chief? Clearly,
when land held in knight-service in chief was devised or given
in the lifetime of,,the donor for the stated purposes, the incidents were due to the king. In 1548-49, the first judicial interpretation of this provision indicated a broad reading of the
language to make any transfer taxable:
Note, for law by the Chancellor of England and justices, that
if the tenant who holds of the king in knight-service in capite,
gives all his land to a stranger, by act executed in his life,
and dies; yet the ki'ng shall have the third part in ward, and
shall have the heir in ward if he be within age. And if of full
age, he shall have primer seisin of the third part, by virtue of
that clause in the statute "Saving to the king ward, primer
seisin, livery" and the like, by which it appears that the intent of the act is that the king shall have as much as if the
tenant had made a will, and had died seised. Yet by all, after
the king is served of his duty of it, the gift is good to the
donee against the heir. 43

Here, even apart from the three purposes expressed in the act,
wardship, primer seisin, and livery attach to any disposition of
land held in knight-service in chief. If this interpretation was
followed, further discussion on the provision would have been
unnecessary.

" Anon. (1548-49), 2 Edw. VI, Brooke's New Cases 179, 73 E.R. 925.
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By 1561, however, this interpretation of the statute was
being questioned. A reader in Gray's Inn, Robert Nowell, provided some thoughts on the nature of conveyances during the
donor's life ("acts executed") in relation to wills as part of his
reading on the Statute of Wills:
And therefore the cause wherefore acts executed are made
mention of in this statute is not to the intent to give men
power to convey their lands away which they might do before,
but to bring the saying which follows after for the advantage
of the prince and the lord giving as it seems the third part in
every case and upon every conveyance made mention of before
by act executed where the heir is within age, the land is held
by knight-service, to the intent that the prince and the lord
by knight-service might receive a benefit of a third part upon
conveyance by act executed as they sustained the loss of two
parts upon conveyance by last will and testament. And the
conveyances by act executed in this statute are not simply and
generally all manner of conveyance by act executed, but [are)
those conveyances within [the statute) and properly are most
like to wills and do provide a remedy for those things which
men most commonly provide for in wills, for their wives, children and payment of their debts, for the words of the statute
be that a man shall have full power and authority by any act
lawfully executed to give and dispose will and assign etc. to
and for the advancement of his wife, preferment of his children, and payment of his debts or otherwise at his will and
pleasure. 44
Thus, by 1561, lawyers were arguing for a more restricted
reading of the statute's application. Only transfers for the specific reasons stated in the statute were to produce the imposition of a payment to the crown. Of the three specific purposes
expressed in the statute, the meaning of "advancement of children" was apparently put before the courts most often. 45 The

•• BL MS Harley 829, f. 28 (emphasis added).
" Why the terminology changed from "preferment of children" in the statute
to "advancement of children" in the contemporary language of the practitioner is
not known. This study follows the lawyers rather than the statute in this regard.
For advancement of a wife, see Floyer's Case (1611), Hi!. 8 Jae. 1, 9 Co. Rep.
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question presented in these cases was whether certain persons
should be considered "lawful generation" for the purposes of
advancing children within the language of the statutes. The
phrase "lawful generation" is found in the preamble of the
Statute of Wills, and if an advancement to a child of lawful
generation was established, wardship or primer seisin would
attach for the conveyance of land held in knight-service in
chief. Thus, the crucial issue was the applicability of the sections of the statutes dealing with wardship and the suing of
liveries for lands "advanced" to certain family members during
the lifetime of the donor. A significant body of law developed
around the question of what was or was not advancement under various circumstances, but in the late 1560s and early
1570s, the law was still open to varying interpretations.
An early case interpreting this provision is from 1568. A
manuscript of Henry Blanchard's reading in 1581 records that
an estate executed to a bastard daughter or son was not within
the statute as it regards wardship and the suing of livery. For
this proposition he cited the case of Dame Woodhouse.4 6 Although the case is not available in printed reports, Hare's
manuscript reports of Court of Wards cases contain the following entry from 1568:
Madam Woodhouse being seised of the manor of A. held in
knight-service in chief made feoffment of this in consideration
of marriage to be entered between Ursula, base daughter of
the said Madam, and William Cotton to the use of him for his
life, the remainder to the said William and Ursula in tail, the
remainder to the right heirs. The said Madam Woodhouse
dies having issue, Dudley Arundell by her second husband,
and her daughter as heir. The which matter was found accordingly by office upon the death of the Madam, upon which
office the said auditor understanding that the said Ursula

125b, 77 E.R. 913, where advancement given to a woman in contemplation of
marriage is held within the statutory definition of "wife."
" CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 72. The case of Madam Woodhouse is noted at 73 E.R.
776 as being located in the Decree Book of the Court of Wards at f. 327 for the
Trinity term of 10 Eliz. (1568). This Decree Book which corresponds to P.R.O.
Ward 9/83 has been classified as "unfit for production" by the P.R.O.
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shall be said one of the daughters of the said Madam and
[therefore) issue within the Statute of Wills, charged the third
part for fault of livery. But upon grand advice and deliverance
of the justices on this point they resolve that the said base
daughter shall take this land as a mere stranger and not as
any child {of] the said Madam as issue. The conveyance [was
made] out of the power of the aforesaid statute upon which she

made discharge by decree of livery etc.47
By 1568, a bastard daughter would not be considered a child
for the purposes of assessing wardship or suing livery upon
advancement by act executed during the life of the parent.
A second similar case is from 1570.48 There, land held in
knight-service was conveyed to the bastard son of the donor,
but the son was "not called bastard or son to the donor."49
Finding that the bastard son was out of the statute's application, the court stated:
And as it seems the bastard shall be out of the statute, because he is, but as any other person, a mere stranger to the
father, quia filius nullius. And the preamble of 32 Henry VIII
[c. l) rehearseth "lawful generation."'0
Consistent with Madam Woodhouse on the question of the
applicability of the statute to bastard sons, its focus on the fact
that the bastard was not recognized or accepted as the son the
donor is notable. The donor's or public's perception of the familial relationship appears to have been a consideration in the
proper characterization of the son.
Other related provisions of the Statute of Wills were being
debated that same year. Dyer reports a discussion of these
provisions in the Court of Wards in 1570. 51 This discussion
indicates that after more than twenty-five years from the en-

" CUL MS Ii.5.17, ff. 3lv-32 (emphasis added).
" Anon. (1570), Mich. 12 & 13 Eliz., 3 Dyer 296b, 73 E.R. 666. This case is a
few months later than the first discussion of the question of collateral relatives in
the Hilary term of 12 Elizabeth addressed next.
49

Id.

" 73 E.R. 666.
" Anon. (1570), Hi!. 12 Eliz., 3 Dyer 386b, 73 E.R. 642.
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actment of the statutes the law on this subject was unsettled.
The general question concerned advancements "in consideration
of natural love and affection to his kindred and blood" with
lp.nds held in knight-service in chief. A relative other than one
in the direct family line presented a difficult case. The judges
were divided:
And in a meeting of all the judges at Serjeants Inn, it was
holden by Onslow Attorney of the Wards, Wray, and Barham
the Queen's serjeant, Harper Justice, Welshe Justice,
Saunders Chief Baron, and Dyer Chief Justice of the Bench,
that children's children, and so on, descending in a right line,
are within the statute etc., and this by the words in the preamble, "generations, family, children, and posterity."52 And
Dyer also thought that collateral cousins should be in the
same predicament. But Keilwey Surveyor of the Liveries,
Carns, Southcot, Weston, and Whiddon Justices, contra, in
both points, etc. and Catlin Chief Justice also: but Saunders
Chief Baron, only in one as above. And in next Trinity, in the
lodgings of Secretary Cecil, Master of the Wards, near the
Savoy, the case was argued for four hours and half, and the
opinions [were] as above, except Carns, who changed his opinion. 53

i

I

t

Thus, at the beginning of 1570, there was little agreement
about how the statute was to be interpreted on this point.
These were also questions considered to be worth long and
repeated debate by the country's top judiciary. It should be
noted that Dyer read the statute broadly to include children's
children and collateral cousins. The important point for our
purposes is that the interpretation of the three purposes clearly
had become more restrictive, excluding strangers and others
from its application. The discussion examines twice the statutory language regarding the three purposes of the disposition,
once to note its presence in the Statute of Wills, and again to
note its absence in the individual section of the Explanation of

52

These words are used in isolation from each other in the Statute of Wills,

preamble.

" 73 E.R. 643.
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the Statute of Wills concerning knight-service in chief:
Also, in the third article of the Statute of Explanations, 34 &
35 Henry VIII [c.5] it is declared and enacted that the king's
tenants in chief hath, and by that act shall have authority to
dispose, etc., to any person or persons (except bodies politic
and corporate) by will or writing, or act executed in life, two
parts, etc. omitting the words, "to and for the advancement of
the wife, preferment of the children, payment of the debts, or
otherwise." Wherefore, etc. Therefore, note the generality, etc.
And Cecil argued sensibly to the same intent. 54
Considering the recital of these requirements in the clause
creating the saving to the king, it is a puzzling argument." It
is not surprising, however, to find Cecil, as Master of the
Wards, arguing for a broad application of the statute.
Despite these discussions and although there were four
other readers on the Statute of Wills in the inns of court between 1561 and 1581, it appears that it was not until
Blanchard's reading of 1581 that the possible issues were given
a full treatment. This was most likely due to the rapidly developing case law in the area at that time and the increasing
availability of reports. 56 After Blanchard's reading, the readings routinely provide a summary of the major issues of advancement under the statute.
The question of whether a bastard was "lawful generation"
was presented again in a case which became known as Gray's
Case. 57 The case concerned Edward Gray who was Lord
.. 73 E.R. 643.
" Stat. Exp!., s. 4.
56
Many factual variations are presented in the reader's cases in St John's
College, Cambridge MS 5.28, ff. 55-58. MSS of Blanchard's reading also provide
good narrative discussions of the topic. BL MS Add. 16169, ff. 262v-263v and BL
MS Add. 35951, ff. 21v-24. Dyer's reports were printed in 1585, but manuscript
reports circulated before this date.
" Gray's Case (1572), Trin. 14 Eliz., 3 Dyer 313b, 73 E.R. 711 (also called
Lord Powis's Case). The MS of Dyer's reports indicates that the case was decided
by all the judges, including Saunders, C.B. and Bacon, L.K. (except Corbett, J.)
and was argued in both the Chancery and the Court of Wards. 1 J .H. BAKER,
REPORTS FROM THE LoST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER 35-36 (Selden Soc'y vol.
109, 1994).
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Powis's bastard son and who received a remainder in land held
in chief. At least two important questions were presented. The
first was whether a bastard son could take under the language
of a gift which stated "to the son." The second concerned
whether a bastard would have to sue livery to take the remainder, a question directly related to the statute. A manuscript
report of the case demonstrates that a bastard could be a valid
purchaser under the language described and evidently placed
considerable weight on the fact that he was "commonly reputed
and taken as son of the said Lord Powis."58 Concerning the
second question, the printed version of Dyer's report of the case
states "and he shall not sue livery, because he is as a stranger,
and not a lawful issue." 59 Therefore, Edward was a son for
some purposes (to take the property), but not for others (to sue
livery). This language appears to have been sufficient justification for readers to state generally that a bastard was "not within the statute." Nonetheless, there was some later confusion
about which of these two separate issues was addressed, and
how they were resolved, by this case.
Gray became a popular case to cite for questions concerning the status of bastards, and readings before the case do not
consider the advancement of a bastard under the statute. John
Popham used the case in 1573 first to examine a disputed son's
right to take under a gift, the non-taxation aspect of the case.
Discussing a reader's case involving a son born overseas,
Popham used Gray by way of analogy to examine the difference
between a son recognized by the law and a son "according to
the common opinion.''"0 Supporting his conclusion that the
alien son, later made a denizen, may take by a devise of the
father to "his son," Popham stated:
And this is the older [alien-born] son only, and he may well
be purchaser by such name, although the law does not count
him to be a son in fact, yet he is his son according to the
common opinion. And so accepted, it is sufficient for him to

5s Id.
" 73 E.R. 711.
" BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 4v.
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make a purchase by such name. As is the case of one, a mere
bastard, which was adjudged in the case of Gray bastard son
of Lord Powes. 61
This use of Gray was based on the discussion found in the
manuscript report, the report addressing the question of whether a bastard may be a purchaser, and .was distinct from the
applicability of the statute to a gift to a bastard from a parent.
Popham's next use of the case addressed the question of
advancement. The applicable part of his reader's case states:
The disseisee reenters and enfeoffs his bastard son born between him and his wife before the coverture. 62
The question was whether this feoffinent of land held in
knight-service in chief to a bastard son constituted an advancement for the purposes of assessing wardship. Finding that it
should be considered an advancement within the statute,
Popham stated:
[l]t seems that this bastard is such person as the statute
intends, because such a bastard may in cases inherit land as
it appears by 20 Assize 663 and by Littleton, 96. And such by
the spiritual law shall be called a son. And for these reasons,
[it is] clearly within the case of the statute. And it appears an
even stronger case than [where] one who is a mere bastard is
within the case of the statute because such appears by the
case now lately adjudged upon the assurance made by the
late Lord Powes to his bastard. 64
Here, although citing Gray, it appears that Popham had come
to the opposite conclusion of the decision as found in the printed reports of Dyer. Popham's use of canon law is noteworthy.
Because under canon law the son would be legitimated by the

s1 Id.
" BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 16.
" BL MS Lansdowne 1133 reads "2 Assize p. 9."
64
BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 16. A reader's case and discussion involving bastard
daughters, but not dealing with advancement, is found at f. 19.
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parents' subsequent marriage, Popham asserted that the transaction was taxable. Thus, this conclusion by Popham and the
1570 discussion quoted at the beginning of this article indicate
that the interpretation of the statute was still unsettled.
In 1575 another case was decided in the Court of Wards
that accorded with the decision of Madam Woodhouse's Case. In
Thornton's Case, a mother during her lifetime gave land held in
knight-service to her bastard daughter. 65 Here Saunders,
Kingsmill, and Keilwey held that "the Queen shall not have
any third part in this case, because she is not a lawful daughter, or child of the mother more than of the father." Dyer, however, doubted this decision. 66 This not only indicates a lingering doubt about the application of the statute to advancements
of bastards, but also Dyer's continuing inclusive interpretation
of the statutory language.
Although he did not cite Gray, Blanchard in 1581 interprets the law to be in accordance with what would· 1ater be
found in the printed report of the case. A manuscript of
Blanchard's reading accurately records the status of a bastard
under Gray as printed:
An act executed to a bastard son for his advancement is not
an advancement meant by the statute and the king shall not
have the wardship of any part. 67

Nonetheless, by this date Gray was just one among many cases
which could support this statement, and another manuscript of
the reading cites Madam Woodhouse for the proposition that an
estate executed to a bastard son or daughter is not within the
meaning of the statute. 68 For example, it is likely that
Blanchard used a case reported by Dyer, as the following entry

" Thornton's Case (1575), Mich. 17 & 18 Eliz., 3 Dyer 345a, 73 E.R. 776.
" 73 E.R. 776.
" BL MS Add 35951, f. 20v. Two other manuscripts record a reader's case in
which the entry of a bastard apparently cut off the right of the lord to wardship.
CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 77v; and St John's College, Cambridge MS 5.28, f. 59v. Another MS notes that an estate executed to a bastard son or daughter is not within
the statute. BL MS Add. 16169, f. 262v.
" CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 72.
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is found in a list of cases vouched by Blanchard during his
reading:
A woman has issue, a bastard daughter, and she herself is
seised of lands held of the queen in chief. She executes estate
of all [her land] to her bastard daughter in fee and dies. And
it was adjudged in the Court of Wards that the queen shall
not have any part, by the advice of Lord Dyer and Lord
Saunders by the report of Lord Dyer [of] 19 Elizabeth. 69

Professor Baker states that this language suggests that Dyer
was orally reporting the case from his own notes. If so, Dyer's
view on the subject appears to have shifted towards a more
exclusionary reading of the statute. In any event, the passage
gives a partial citation to and an accurate reporting of the
holding in Thornton.
The only manuscript of Robert Gardiner's reading of 1584
indicates that the topic of bastardy was also raised there.
Gardiner presented the issue in a reader's case involving a
bastard eigne ("older son") and a legitimate younger son, a
factual pattern found in many readers' cases. Unfortunately,
the argument of the case is not recorded, although the arrangement of the text in the manuscript indicates that the case was
argued.7° As the reader's case involves the bastard eigne disseising the father and the father subsequently releasing all his
right to the bastard, one issue clearly raised by the case was
the advancement of the bastard during the life of the father.
John Shirley in 1588 also considered the implications of
bastardy as it related to an advancement of a child. Although
the issue is not explicitly presented in his reader's cases, two
records of the argument reveal that it was discussed. The first
reference to the topic found is
(i]f a mother of a bastard conveys land to the bastard, although he be in notice of the world her son, this is not advancement because he is not of "lawful generation. "71

" BL MS Add. 35951, f. 14v.
" LI MS Misc. 367, p. 73.
" CUL MS Ee.4.5, f. 49.
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Here, Shirley has accurately stated the rule derived from two
of the cases presented. The elements of this statement are the
mother's conveyance (Thornton) and a bastard son publicly
known as such (Gray).
A second manuscript of the reading also contains a reference to the topic:

I

A bastard is not a child within this statute because the words
of the statute are "lawful generation."72

r;

Thus, even when the reader's case did not expressly raise the
issue, readers or those arguing the readers' cases believed that
it was an issue worth presenting. The example of Shirley's
reading demonstrates the use of Gray and its progeny without
a citation to the cases. Perhaps by 1588 any sensational quality
of the case had died; no one now cared that Edward Gray was
the bastard of Lord Powis, and there were now several cases
that could be cited for this same principle. Nonetheless, the
legal principle was important enough for its inclusion in the
readings to continue. The section of the reading which presented this issue sets out fully other advancement issues as well,
such as whether a grant benefiting the wife of the son is advancement to the son within the statute. 73 No doubt, when a
reader came to read on the provision concerning acts executed
during the life of the donor, he and his audience expected to
cover the general law surrounding advancement.
For his reading, Hugh Hare appears to have copied substantial portions of Popham's reading without making sure his
statements were current. This is the only example of wholesale
copying found among the readings on the Statute of Wills.
Hare's reliance on Popham's reading got him into difficulty
concerning the law of bastardy. Dyer's Reports had been published more than six years before the date of Hare's reading,
1592. The basic principle of law on the topic was settled, not
only by Gray but by later cases and the expositions found in
" BL MS Add. 16169, f. 367v.
" CUL MS Ee.4.5, f. 49.
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the readings after Popham: Generally, a bastard was not within the language of the statute, although a bastard was sufficient to take as a purchaser under a gift which recited "son."
Nonetheless, Hare, copying from Popham's reading, misstated
the law:
And this bastard is such son as this statute intends, because
such bastard may in cases be inheritable to land. And by the
spiritual law shall be called son and thereby clearly within
the case of the statute. But if he was a mere bastard who by
no possibility may be his heir and of whom the law never
takes account as of a stranger, it shall be otherwise than this
case is put. The wardship of the heir and of the land shall be
given to the king. 74

This demonstrates further Hare's unquestioning reliance on
Popham's reading. It seems an odd mistake for someone about
to step into a high position in the Court of Wards.
Augustine Nicholls's reading of 1602 presents the following
analysis:
·
An estate executed to a bastard is not within the statute.
Dyer, 313, 296. But an estate executed to a bastard eigne is
within this statute [because] a covenant by natural affection
shall raise a use to him. But if a man takes a second wife, the
first wife living, and has issue by her, such son is not within
the statute and he is a mere bastard. 75

Here Nicholls has set out the general principle citing Gray and
the anonymous case decided in 1570 addressing bastardy. His
statements continue with the complicating factors of natural
affection towards a relative and, it appears, divorce for precontract.
The status of a bastard for the purposes of advancement
and the third due to the king is also considered in Henry
Sherfield's reading of 1624:
And lawful children and no others are those who are meant

" BL MS Lansdowne 1141, f. 40.
" LI MS Maynard 19(b), f. 5v.
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by the law. And a child by reputation only is not within [the
statute] but he must be a child in law and truth. Thus a bastard child although he be of his mother is not a child within
the law, because the statute provides for their "lawful generation. "76
The question arose again later in a reader's case in which a son
was arguably made a bastard by divorce for precontract, a
factual twist also used by Nicholls:
Response to the third objection that by the divorce the issue
is a bastard, and thus A. is not a child within the law. I have
argued to the contrary before and therefore nothing more
shall be said on this point. But if it were thus, perhaps this
would be a child within the law. As if a man makes a conveyance for the advancement of his wife and after there is a
divorce by reason of precontract, this is within the law, because she is a wife by reputation. And if there is a recovery
against such husband and wife, shall a divorce afterwards
[affect the recovery] according to this act? Certainly not. Relation shall not make a wrong to destroy a settled estate. And
Popham holds accordingly as to the wife in his reading upon
this statute.
I wish to confess that a bastard is out of this statute, but this
is to be understood as such bastard who was both in truth
and reputation a bastard always. But as I have argued before
[there is] no question that the issue after a divorce by reason
of precontract of the husband, whereof the wife knew nothing,
shall be always legitimate and shall inherit [from] the mother
and the father. 77

76

BL MS Stowe 424, f. 42. The passage continues with related discussion and
a citation to Sir George Curson's Case (1607), East. 5 Jae. I, 6 Co. Rep. 75b, 77
E.R. 369, discussing advancements to relatives other than children.
" BL MS Stowe 424, f. 77v. The passage cites Leonard Lovies's Case (1613),
East. 11 Jae. 1, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 E.R. 1043, which presents a summary of
prior case on this point at 77 E.R. 1049-50 and cites Curson's Case among others.
Concerning the effect of the divorce, Nicholls was following established canon law.
See R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND 6 (1990). The
statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38 (1540) on precontracts would have been an important
part of the analysis of the fact patterns presented by Nicholls and Sherfield.
CLERKE, supra note 1, at 79-81; and HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra, at
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Sherfield explores the possibility of a divorce creating a bastard
and the effect of this change of status.
The last reading on wills, delivered by Richard Townesend
in 1631, also included the factual situation of a bastard in a
reader's case. Following this reader's case is a full page of notes
addressing the topic of bastards under the statute and a hurried list of phrases and citations. These include citations to
Gray and Thornton which follow the statement, "a bastard is
no child within 32 Henry VIII of wills although his mother conveys lands to him. "78

Ill. NEW LAW AND

POLITICAL POSITIONING

The factual situation of advancing a bastard child provided
a frequent topic for readers to present. The interpretation of
the statute regarding advancement appears to have been of
general importance for the readers, and the question of advancement to bastards presented an interesting legal issue, one
of practical importance and with recent case interpretation. It
is even possible to speculate as to Dyer's change of mind about
the interpretation of the statute. Furthermore, it appears that
the cases were sufficiently new and the principles expounded
sufficiently important to find their inclusion in many of the
manuscripts of the readings.
Readers could use the readings as an opportunity to transmit their interpretation of various statutes for political purposes. The first recorded restrictive interpretation of the statutory
provision is found in a reading, Robert Nowell's reading in
Gray's Inn in 1561. Despite this anti-revenue position, Nowell
was appointed the Attorney of the Court of Wards the same
year he read. 79 Nowell's interpretation was then adopted by
the Court of Wards seven years later in the decision of Madam
Woodhouse's Case. This interpretation was repeated in an
anonymous case from the Court of Wards in 1570 and again in
74.

" CUL MS Dd.5.51(d), f. 26v.
79

BELL, supra note 4, at 22, n. 4.
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Gray's Case in 1572.
One year after the decision in Gray's Case, John Popham
presented a similar problem in his reading. Nonetheless,
Popham argued for a broad application of the statute and cited
Gray's Case for the opposite rule of law, asserting that a bastard child was within the application of the statute. When
Popham read, Dyer's reports, which provided the first printed
report of Gray's Case, were not to appear for several more
years. Manuscripts and reasonable memories could differ in the
holding of a case. Popham's argument equates the statutory
definition of who is a child with the donor's intent and the
donor's characterization of the donee. Because Popham's example dealt with an illegitimate child whose parents later married, this interpretation would also harmonize the definition of
legitimacy under the Statute of Wills with the view of the ecclesiastical law. Finally, Popham had been appointed to the Privy
Council in 1571, and perhaps this revenue producing interpretation was consistent with his new office.
Question concerning the proper interpretation of the provision lingered into the mid-1570s. Dyer read the provision
broadly in 1570 and kept to this interpretation in Thornton's
Case in 1575. Nonetheless, by 1581 it appears that Dyer had
changed his view according to a manuscript of Henry
Blanchard's reading. Because Dyer and Blanchard were both
members of Middle Temple and both readers on the Statute of
Wills, Dyer may have been in attendance at Blanchard's reading.
The only reader after Blanchard to argue for a broader
interpretation of the statute was Hugh Hare, who copied
Popham's argument. By the time of his reading in 1592, Hare
had been joint clerk of the Court of Wards for two years, and
this reading of the statute would be consistent with his position.
Thus, for the most part, from 1581 onwards, the law was
settled and readers consistently asserted that bastard children
were outside the application of the statute. The appearance of
Dyer's report of Gray's Case in 1585 must have done much to
settle any doubts about this exception, Hugh Hare's reading
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notwithstanding.
In an era when statutes were still viewed as "amending
mischiefs," lawyers were beginning to see that statutory language could lead to unintended consequences. The interplay
between statute and case law was more complex than the accepted view that statutes adjusted unwanted shifts of the common law. The manuscripts of the readings also indicate the
rather fluid way in which case authorities, even after their
being set into print, were presented, used, interpreted and
misinterpreted. Using a base of statutory texts, the readings
provided a critical setting for statutory interpretation within
the common law tradition, a setting where legal knowledge
could be displayed, shared, and transmitted. Readings not only
advanced the political and professional aspirations of the readers, but also served as important bridges between case law and
statute, between legal education and legal practice .
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